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Abstract Individuals, businesses and governments 
undertake an ever-growing range of activities online and 
via various Internet-enabled digital devices. Unfortunately, 
these activities, services, information and devices are the 
targets of cybercrimes. Verifying the user legitimacy to 
use/access a digital device or service has become of the 
utmost importance. Authentication is the frontline 
countermeasure of ensuring only the authorized user is 
granted access; however, it has historically suffered from a 
range of issues related to the security and usability of the 
approaches. They are also still mostly functioning at the 
point of entry and those performing sort of 
re-authentication executing it in an intrusive manner. Thus, 
it is apparent that a more innovative, convenient and secure 
user authentication solution is vital. This paper reviews the 
authentication methods along with the current use of 
authentication technologies, aiming at developing a current 
state-of-the-art and identifying the open problems to be 
tackled and available solutions to be adopted. It also 
investigates whether these authentication technologies have 
the capability to fill the gap between high security and user 
satisfaction. This is followed by a literature review of the 
existing research on continuous and transparent 
multimodal authentication. It concludes that providing 
users with adequate protection and convenience requires 
innovative robust authentication mechanisms to be utilized 
in a universal level. Ultimately, a potential federated 
biometric authentication solution is presented; however it 
needs to be developed and extensively evaluated, thus 
operating in a transparent, continuous and user-friendly 
manner. 
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1 Introduction 
Protecting an IT system against unauthorized user activities 
is usually provided via user identification or authentication 
which enable successful authorization and subsequently 
accountability – these concepts together are referred to as 
AAA [1]. The identity of a user is required by a system to 
authenticate/verify user’s credentials against an 
authentication database to decide whether he/she is the 
legitimate claimed individual. For instance, a username is a 
way of claiming an identity and a password is one method 
for providing authentication. Proceeding to a successful 
verification, authorization is established based on the 
predefined devices and/or services the verified user is 
allowed to access on a system with specified privileges. 
Accountability provides the means to attribute activities 
each user performs on a system and keeps tracks of them – 
usually through historical logs. 
Therefore, managing appropriate authentication is the 
pivotal concept for implementing information security 
within an IT system. Achieving a high level of 
confidentiality, integrity, authorization, and accountability 
of an IT system would not be possible without carefully 
considering various aspects; a vital one of them is 
safeguarding sensible, robust and useable authentication. 
Authentication can be achieved by utilizing one or more of 
the three fundamental approaches: something the user 
knows (including passwords, PINs, graphical passwords, 
and cognitive questions), something the user has (including 
SIMs, smart cards, certificates, mobile phones, and 
hardware/software one-time password (OTP) tokens) and 
something the user is (biometrics) [2]. 
The first two authentication approaches have been 
employed in most security systems surrounding today’s 
digital society. However, the third one has emerged 
gradually from being research and utilized mainly by 
governments (e.g. forensics and borders), to becoming more 
available in the public domain (biometrics are now 
deployed in a wide range of applications that are fairly 
mainstream – passports, mobile phones, schools, police).  
The authors aim at building an authentication system 
that would provide a more secure, user-friendly, universal, 
and technology independent environment. In order to 
achieve this, the following research objectives are 
established: 
 To review the authentication methods including both the 
problems and available solutions. 
  To investigate the state-of-the-practice of authentication 
technologies provided by various sectors. 
 To develop a current state-of-the-art understanding of 
the biometric authentication techniques including its 
applications in the existing research on continuous, 
transparent and distributed authentication. 
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews 
the conventional authentication approaches. Then Section 3 
examines the current use of authentication technologies 
offered by service providers and devices manufacturers in 
order to explore whether they solve some issues related to 
the research area. Furthermore, a number of featured 
authentication frameworks are subsequently discussed in 
Section 4, in terms of the benefits they offer in balancing 
the trade-off between security and usability as well as their 
shortcomings. Furthermore, Section 5 undertakes a 
thorough review of the literature related to continuous and 
transparent authentication focusing upon those utilized 
multimodal biometrics, encompassing their open issues, 
users’ perceptions, and desirable requirements, leading to 
an outline of the proposed solution alongside its limitations 
and future changes. Finally, the conclusion and sought 
features are presented in Section 6. 
2 Conventional Authentication Approaches 
2.1 Secret Knowledge-based Approach 
This approach refers to the process where the user has to 
remember a secret which is a particular sequence of inputs, 
typically made up of numbers only (PIN); numbers, 
characters and/or symbols (password and passphrase); 
answer(s) to predefined question(s) (cognitive knowledge); 
or images (graphical password) [3]. This secret is set 
initially by the user or generated by the authenticating 
system. Thus, it is known mutually by both the user (brain) 
and the system (database) and there must be an exact match 
between them to be able to have access.  This means that it 
is a Boolean authentication process – its outcome is either 
one (totally true secret thus allow access) or zero (totally 
false secret thus deny access). As a result, there is an 
integral reliance on humans’ memory and their ability to 
recall the secret exactly as and when prompted regardless of 
its length, sophistication, and uniqueness. Furthermore, it 
does not defend well against repudiation [4] as the so called 
secret is transferable, guessable and can be watched by 
others through shoulder surfing. 
2.1.1 Personal Identification Number (PIN), 
Password and Passphrase 
A PIN is considered the simplest knowledge-based 
authentication technique. It is apparently available to be 
used within mobile phones: for the mobile handset itself 
(switch on or unlock) and/or for the Subscriber Identity 
Module (SIM) card (to authenticate with the cellular 
networks) and with cash/credit cards. Typically, a mobile 
PIN ranges from 4 to 8 digits only. As numbers only are 
relatively easier to recall, they are easier to guess and to 
steel. Passwords, which can be longer and are made of some 
or all of numbers, letters and symbols, mitigate the 
possibility of being predicted. They are believed to offer 
effective protection if they are established and employed 
appropriately.  
Despite the fact that passwords are still the most 
ubiquitous authentication method (perhaps due to its 
perceived convenience and inexpensive implementation as 
they are conceptually quite simple to design, manage and 
use), they are vulnerable to be misused by users. 
PINs/Passwords protections are often compromised through 
the failure or unwillingness of individuals to correctly 
practice the password policy to protect and administer 
sensitive information [5, 6]. For instance, 58% of the latter 
survey respondents never changed their PINs. Worse than 
that, it is also revealed in the former survey of 330 young 
people aged 18 to 25 that over 71% of the participants do 
not even use PINs or any other authentication methods to 
lock their mobile phones though their availability. Further 
more recent survey conducted by Crawford and Renaud [7] 
showed that 30% of participants do not enable any security 
on their mobile devices although sensitive information 
resides on them. Whilst some practice improvements are 
notable, the small population (30 participants) of this survey 
is an issue but even so when factoring this percentage to the 
worldwide mobile users it will be significant. 
More recently, many digital services create password 
policies and guidelines to encourage good practice, which 
are adopted by many organizations to be utilized by their 
employees. Some of these policies are difficult to ensure 
they are being followed and hence they can be avoided. For 
instance, it is possible to violate these policies by using 
dictionary words, using them on multiple systems, writing 
them down and not or rarely changing them. For example 
61% of 1200 surveyed respondents reuse the same 
password on multiple websites, besides 44% of them 
change their password merely once a year or less [8]. 
Others are enforceable, such as the length of password, 
complexity and its lifetime. Accordingly, when users are 
faced with the need to memorize multiple passwords and 
change them periodically, they tend to forgetting 
passwords, writing them down, and selecting easily guessed 
ones [4]. Therefore, the problem is exacerbated as they 
would become susceptible to be stolen. Moreover, 
additional administrative costs would be posed by frequent 
passwords resetting [4]. The above-mentioned studies also 
implied that some people would rather setup the same but 
very sophisticated password on multiple accounts; however 
this exasperates the issue if one of these accounts is 
compromised, all others may follow, as the intruder will be 
able to reuse the same cracked password to login to them. 
Passphrases come as an alternative endeavor to balance 
the trade-off between the simplicity of remembering a 
secret by the genuine user and the difficulty of predicting it 
by intruders. Passphrases are sequence of words built to be 
used as credential secret. They are usually without spaces 
 but possibly with digits replacing letters or words; for 
example, “Going4al0n9journy”. It can be noted that they 
are similar to passwords in terms of usage and appearance 
except that the former are longer normally thus more robust. 
On the other hand, it is argued that passphrases are easier to 
remember than passwords especially if they carry an 
associated meaning. However, if they consist of common 
words from a language dictionary, they would be vulnerable 
to be broken with less effort. In addition, common 
substitutes, such as “4=for” and “0=o”, render it less secure 
and more confusing to recall alike. 
Brute-force attack tools (attempting every possible 
combination automatically), such as Brutus and OphCrack, 
are notorious against most of knowledge-based 
authentication techniques [9]. Some countermeasures have 
been proposed against them and to reduce the likelihood of 
a system or device being abused by imposters during the 
usage session and before it ends. For instance, the account 
would be temporary blocked or further credentials would be 
requested after three failed access attempts or the user 
would be required to re-authenticate again after specific or 
lapse time dependent upon the system settings or the user’s 
preference. Even though that this seems to move the PINs, 
passwords and passphrases from being a mere 
point-of-entry technique, it most probably bothers the user 
due to its constant intrusiveness. 
2.1.2 Cognitive Knowledge Question 
Cognitive knowledge which comes in a form of question(s) 
seeks to alleviate the load of users memorizing desperate 
passwords thereby deploying associative question(s) [10]. 
These questions are typically about personal information, 
such as mother’s maiden name and city of birth, or 
preferences, such as favorite color and movie. Therefore, it 
is evident that this technique lacks one of the main 
characteristics of secret knowledge-based authentication 
approach, i.e. secrecy. By predicting or conducting online 
search or social engineering, it is possible to have the 
correct answer(s) – the higher the possibility of an answer 
to deduce or associate, the higher it is vulnerable to crack.  
So, it is apparent that this approach cannot be 
dependable as a standalone authentication approach. This 
could be overcome by requiring a user to answer a group of 
cognitive knowledge questions or alternatively utilizing it 
besides another authentication approach (as explained in 2.4 
sub-section). Whilst this solution probably enhances 
security by adding another layer, it potentially increases the 
burden on the user thereby lengthening the time of 
authentication and requiring them to recall and provide 
multiple secrets (i.e. the password and the answers of the 
cognitive questions). However, this approach offers 
opportunities of supporting the security level of other than 
secret-knowledge ones, such as OTP tokens. Furthermore, it 
can be used as a remedial approach for resetting the 
password when users for instance forget their password or 
are locked-out due to exceeding the maximum failed login 
attempts. 
2.1.3 Patterns and Graphical Passwords 
Solutions have been suggested to mitigate the downsides of 
PIN, password and passphrase, some of which solely 
concern about guidelines promoting increasing the entropy 
of passwords. However, human inability to memorize and 
remember multi complex passwords is not addressed by 
them. It is believed and has been proven that the human 
brain is more capable to store and remember pictorial 
information than textual [11]. As a result, pattern password 
authentication has emerged, with which a user is required to 
recognize and sequentially draw a pre-set outline on nine 
(3x3) dots grid that appear on a touch screen. Therefore, it 
is argued that it will be much more convenient to the user to 
recognize a pattern than an alphanumeric password. In 
addition, [12] showed and argued that repeated entry of 
pictorial password would be with “lower cognitive load and 
higher memorability” to the user. Mobile devices with 
touch screens make it reasonably plausible to utilize pattern 
password, which is used in Android devices, to improve the 
memorability of the secret. 
However, in the current functioning pattern passwords, 
users are able only to stroke and drag (draw a direct line 
between) two adjacent dots, which in turn limit the number 
of permutations. As a result, the typical application of it is 
more vulnerable to brute-force attacks. Some attempts have 
been conducted to overcome this shortcoming. For instance, 
[13] extend this typical pattern password to allow skipping 
dots (as demonstrated in Fig. 1), thus enhancing its 
resilience to brute-force attacks by allowing more 
combinations. Nevertheless, its accuracy is quite low (77%) 
with a 19% false rejection rate and 21% false acceptance 
rate. Furthermore, besides the fact that this approach is still 
secret-knowledge based and hence inherits most of its 
drawbacks, such as shoulder surfing, it is susceptible to a 
so-called smudge attacks when a secret pattern can be 
simply determined on a greasy screen [14].  
To obtain the most from the advantages of human's 
ability to remember graphical over alphanumeric secrets, 
some approaches have been proposed. For example, with 
click-based graphical authentication, there is a generic 
image where the user is required to click on pre-specified 
obscured points [15]. Albeit evaluations have demonstrated 
its usability improvement in relation to memorability, it is 
relatively difficult to click precisely on a point, especially if 
the point space is small and while using finger tips on touch 
screen. This leads to increase authentication failures that 
might bother the user. Moreover, poor selection of 
background images that have popular potential points yields 
to being easily predicted, for instance a study by [16] 
cracked an average of 7–10% of user passpoints 
(click-based) passwords within 3 guesses only.  
  
Fig.1 Pattern with the Possibility of Points to be Skipped [13] 
Further to the work on click-based concept, proposals 
about choice-based or PassImages graphical authentication 
have risen [17, 18]; in addition to the recent application of 
the concept on Windows 8.1 Picture Password [19]. There 
are a set of images on sequential grids; the secret is among 
them in a form of a series of images that should be pressed 
or clicked on a specific order, one at each grid. To 
overcome shoulder surfing attacks, the distribution of 
images on each grid should be randomized. Likewise, the 
product of [20] capitalizes on the psychological theory that 
human's brains recognize and recall faces better than any 
other picture or object [21]. Users are able to use familiar 
personal photos that are stored on the ones PC or on the 
web to form passfaces, with which the possibility of 
forgetting them is very rare. In the login process, the user is 
encountered by a 3 by 3 grid that contains one of the pre-set 
photos among 8 others. Similar to the other graphical 
password methods, there are three consecutive grids to 
identifying all three faces. Accordingly, the time taken to 
pass all the steps of graphical authentication could be an 
issue of inconvenience. Again, poor selection of photos 
makes them susceptible to be known by imposters. 
Moreover, given that it is a secret-knowledge approach, it 
can be shared and left not changed. 
2.2 Token-based Approach 
To overcome some of the abovementioned downsides of 
secret knowledge-based approach, tokens have been 
developed. Generally, the token-based authentication 
approach has various applications ranging from physical to 
logical accesses to systems and services. Based on the 
external appearance and the need for additional devices, 
they can be categorized into two types: Hardware Tokens 
and Software Tokens [22]. With the former type, a separate 
token physical device is produced and provided, usually, by 
the service provider, such as bank smartcard and HSBC 
Secure Key OTP token [23]. On the other hand, with the 
latter type, there is utilization of an existing device as is, 
such as when sending OTP via short messaging service 
(SMS) to the user’s registered mobile phone, or there is a 
need to install software (application) on the user’s 
smartphone or PC [22], such as Google authenticator [24]. 
A typical authentication token either stores static but 
complex passwords or generates a OTP for each session 
[25]. The user is required to enter the generated password 
on the system or service he is authenticating to or it is 
synchronized directly. From one prospective, they have 
some advantages over the secret knowledge-based methods 
in that they are capable of storing, recalling and generating 
multiple and sophisticated passwords, thus lifting this 
burden from the human brain. However, reliance on human 
is still existent as it is assumed that the token is in the 
possession of the accredited user – they merely verify the 
presence of the token not the authorized user. Having said 
this, in recent tokens, PIN is prompted to validate the user 
for a subsequent legitimate use of the token; however, the 
token can be lent, lost or stolen and the PIN can be shared. 
Tokens provide compromise detection, for example if 
three failed attempts threshold is exceeded, as well as 
countermeasure denial-of-service attacks [4], albeit they are 
not fail-safe – the breach of RSA SecureID tokens in 2011 
evidences this [26]. Therefore, it is evident that this 
approach cannot stand by itself to be effective at inhibiting 
masquerade attacks. As a result, typically, it is employed 
with at least another authentication factor to form an 
approach called multi-factor authentication which is 
elaborated in the sub-section 2.4. 
It is apparent that the cost of issuing, maintaining and 
recovering them is higher. Simply issuing (or reissuing if 
lost or stolen) SIM, smart cards or hardware tokens is 
adding additional cost over passwords. This is worsened if 
specialized devices are required, such as card readers. For 
example, if a bank plans to employ hardware tokens to 
access its online banking, there is a need to purchase 
tokens/token readers for all its customers, implement and 
maintain them, along with providing technical support and 
potential replacement in case they are lost or malfunctioned. 
Moreover, time synchronization between the token and 
system might be difficult with those time-synchronous 
tokens [25], especially in out-of-coverage areas. 
Furthermore, user convenience is an issue, in particular 
when users need to carry a variety of tokens for different 
accounts and services from different providers which make 
it cumbersome and probably impractical. 
2.3 Biometrics 
In seeking a more reliable and robust authentication 
approach, attention has turned to biometrics. 
Biometrics-based authentication is commonly 
acknowledged as a reliable solution that provides enhanced 
authentication over the secret knowledge-based and 
token-based approaches. Unlike the previous approaches, 
biometrics enables both identification and verification 
processes. Regardless of whether the user has claimed an 
identity initially or not, the high level of uniqueness 
biometrics offers facilitates the process. It also removes the 
reliance upon the individual to either memorize and recall 
complex and various passwords or carry and secure tokens. 
However, whilst the resulting decision of other approaches 
is with complete accuracy (i.e. a Boolean decision), 
biometrics results in a confidence measure, with a 
pre-determined threshold deciding on whether this 
confidence is sufficient to accept or reject access. Thus, 
 there is a margin for this decision being wrong; either by 
allowing access to an imposter or denying access of the 
authorized user. Accordingly, the performance of a typical 
biometrics technique is measured based on its error rates, 
such as False Acceptance Rate (FAR), False Rejection Rate 
(FRR) and Equal Error Rate (EER). 
Biometrics is dependent upon measurable and 
distinctive characteristics of an individual. They can be 
categorized based upon their underlying characteristics into: 
physiological and behavioral approaches [27, 28]. 
Physiological biometrics are those based upon a unique 
physical aspect of the body, such as a fingerprint, face, or 
iris, whereas behavioral biometrics utilizes the distinctive 
way in which humans behave, such as voice, keystroke and 
signature, to identify and/or verify a user. Both categories 
are non-transferable to others, unforgettable, believed to 
uniquely (with a varying level of accuracy) identify 
individuals, not easily lent or stolen, and difficult to 
reproduce, change or hide. As such, they offer a strong 
defense against repudiation [29]. However, biometric 
systems error rates and cost, together with usability have 
been hindering their widespread adoption [30]; 
notwithstanding, recent years have shown that this has been 
alleviated by significant enhancement in biometric systems 
capabilities [31, 32]. Nevertheless, stable uni-biometrics can 
be forged albeit some with difficulty [4]. For instance, 
traditional facial recognition can be fooled by a photo of the 
authorized person and voice recognition can be faked by 
imitation or voice recording. Therefore, they can be used in 
combination with a token that can store the user’s identity 
or a password (as elucidated in the following sub-section) 
or additional data is required to determine whether a sample 
is alive. Liveness detection have been suggested and 
implemented to determine whether the provided biometric 
sample is from a living legitimate user utilizing some 
biological indicators, such as blood flow and blinking for 
iris scan, and temperature and pulse for fingerprint systems 
[10, 25, 33]. Whilst these metrics have added a level of 
protection, some of them suffer from their own weaknesses 
and hence are forgeable. For instance, an impersonator can 
hold a photo of an authorized person with two eye holes, 
stand behind it and blink in front of a facial recognition 
system. However, devising a biometrics system deploying a 
set of countermeasures makes it robust and difficult to 
compromise. Alternatively, multibiometrics would offer a 
more resilient authentication solution as can be seen in 5.1. 
2.4 Multi-Layer and -Factor Authentication  
To improve and augment the level of protection, two or 
more authentication techniques can be employed in 
combination. It has, even, been recommended by the 
European Central Bank that financial service providers 
should deploy “strong authentication” in all their online 
transactions [34]. It can comprise multiple techniques from 
the same authentication approach (multi-layer 
authentication), such as password and cognitive questions, 
or from different authentication approaches (multi-factor 
authentication), such as PIN and smart card, password and 
facial recognition, or fingerprint and OTP generator token. 
This can then be reinforced by elements such as predefined 
user location which can be based on either the mobile 
cellular network (i.e. cell ID), the global positioning system 
(GPS) (i.e. longitude and latitude) [1], and/or the IP address.  
The multi-layer method lack adherence to regulations of 
some sensitive sectors, such as banks where it is not 
compatible with the Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council regulations that emphasized clearly 
that these factors are required to be from two or more of the 
authentication categories [35]. Therefore, it can be inferred 
that multi-factor authentication is considered stronger than 
multi-layer one – thus banking sector has utilized 
multi-factor authentication in one way or another, such as 
the bank card and PIN or password and OTP token for 
online banking. On the other hand, although some recent 
smartphones are equipped with a built-in facial recognition 
or fingerprint sensor, they operate separately as an 
alternative single authentication method not multi-factor, 
i.e. the user has the option either to enable PIN or the 
fingerprint not both of them together. Hence, to the author 
best knowledge no multi-factor authentication method has 
been utilized to access mobile phones thus far. 
Nevertheless, while the aforementioned approaches 
increase the level of security, they add a further burden, 
from the perspective of the user, and remain at the 
point-of-entry. Re-authenticating the user periodically is not 
viable because of its intrusiveness. Furthermore, they 
increase the cost of provisioning, managing and 
implementing various authentication methods. 
3 A Review of Current Use of Authentication 
Technologies 
It can be perceived that the integral aim of any IT 
authentication system is to safeguard resources against any 
illegitimate access. Therefore, service providers as well as 
device manufacturers require or offer a form of 
authentication technologies to protect them from any 
unauthorized access. Authentication technologies vary 
perhaps dependent on the data sensitivity involved and the 
users’ requirements, and each have their own benefits and 
weaknesses. This section investigates some of the available 
provided authentication mechanisms, with the aim of 
identifying their capabilities for accomplishing the aim of 
this research. 
A number of service providers and devices 
manufacturers offer a variety of authentication technologies 
seeking to fill the gap between high protection and 
usability. Thus, it is useful to review some of these attempts 
with the current authentication technologies employed 
with/by a sample of service/device providers; namely:  
 HSBC [23],  
 NatWest [36],  
 Lloyds [37],  
  SAMBA (Saudi American Bank) [38],  
 Windows 8.1 Laptop/PC [39, 19],  
 Android (Samsung Galaxy S5 and above) [40, 41],  
 iPhone 5S and above [42, 43] and  
 Google Authenticator [24].  
This set was selected because it is believed that they 
represent a wide range of services and providers that offer a 
variety of advanced authentication methods. Moreover, due 
to the fact that banks hold high sensitive financial data, they 
are expected to strive to deploy the most advanced robust 
identity verification procedures. Other less critical and/or 
less common service providers and services are deemed not 
to utilize such resilient protection tools. Thus, half of the 
selected list is banks in addition to the most dominant 
operating systems [44]. Google Authenticator is also 
included for the sake of diversity and inclusion as it has a 
different approach than the remaining listed technologies 
and it works with many leading websites such as Amazon 
Web Services, Dropbox, and Facebook [45]. 
Table 1 reveals an overview of these authentication 
technologies in order to better appreciate whether they have 
solved and mitigated the issues of traditional authentication 
flaws by enhancing security as well as improving the 
usability of authentication.  
Table 1 An Overview of Current Authentication Technologies 
Service/Device 
Providers 
Secret-based Token-based Biometrics-based Point-of-entry Re-Authentication 
HSBC [23] 
 User ID 
 Cognitive question 
 PIN 
 Separate Hardware OTP X   
(New OTP) 
 New payee 
 Transfer money 
NatWest [36] 
 User ID 
 PIN 
 Password 
 Separate Hardware OTP 
(Card-Reader) 
 Digital banking card 
X   
(New OTP) 
 New payee 
 New standing order 
 Change password 
 Change phone 
Lloyds [37] 
 User ID 
 Password 
 Cognitive question 
X X   
(New OTP with  
Automated call to  
registered mobile) 
 New payee 
 Transfer money 
SAMBA [38] 
 User ID 
 Password 
 Separate Hardware OTP 
OR 
 Mobile (SMS) OTP 
X   
(New OTP) OR (ATM login) 
 New payee 
 Transfer money 
Windows 8.1  
[39, 19] 
 User ID 
 Password 
 Picture password 
X X    Websites accounts 
Android (Galaxy 
S5) [40, 41] 
 PIN 
 Pattern 
 Password 
X 
 Face 
 Fingerprint 
  X 
iPhone (5S)  
[42, 43] 
 PIN 
 Password 
X  Fingerprint   
 Access iTunes 
 New purchase 
Google 
Authenticator [24] 
 User ID 
 Password 
 Mobile OTP X   X 
Accessing all of the services mentioned in Table 1 
above requires a form of secret-based information, 
including user ID, PIN, password, pattern, and/or cognitive 
question(s) all of which are needed to be memorized and 
recalled by users. All of these services except Lloyds bank 
augment their authentication process by offering the option 
of employing multi-factor authentication or imposing it.  
To be able to unlock an Android (Galaxy S5/6) or iPhone 
(5S) device, a user selects to provide either a secret (i.e. PIN 
or password (for both), pattern (for Android)) or biometrics 
(i.e. face/fingerprint, or fingerprint, respectively).  
On the other hand, accessing HSBC and SAMBA online 
banking systems must happen by entering secret 
information (i.e. user ID and cognitive question or 
password), in addition to having a separate hardware token 
for either banks, or using the user’s mobile as token that 
generates OTP or via SMS, respectively. However, two of 
the services employ two-layer authentication for the initial 
access: NatWest and Lloyds banks. The former asks only 
for user ID and password whereas the latter adds them with 
a cognitive question to log in. Nevertheless, the user will be 
prompted to provide an additional credential, OTP, when a 
critical service is requested, such as creating new payee. To 
do so, NatWest customers ought to have digital banking 
card with a separate PIN to use with their Card-Reader to 
generate the OTP while Lloyds customers will see a OTP 
on screen and they will receive an automated phone call to 
their pre-registered mobile for confirmation. 
 These techniques might be perceived as a sensible 
trade-off between security and convenience. However, they 
arguably on one hand merely augment security but on the 
other hand degrade user friendliness, or the vice versa. For 
example, with HSBC, NatWest and SAMBA, the user must 
carry a separate token which only proves its presence not 
the legitimacy of the user. Additionally, logging in Lloyds 
online banking requires the user to recall 3 distinct secrets. 
Given the difficult users experience with remembering 
secrets and tokens, these approaches merely serve to 
increase this burden. 
The Google Authenticator app can offer an alternative 
solution as it is available in different platforms including 
iOS, Android and Blackberry and is easier to use than 
separate tokens as smartphones are carried around by users 
most of the time. Conversely, the backup secrets (that can 
be used if there is a difficulty in receiving the automatically 
generated code) can be stored in the device in an 
unencrypted text file [24]. Once it is lost or stolen, the 
service is susceptible to be accessed by the unauthorized 
holder of the device. 
On the other hand, there are some encouraging signs and 
endeavors regarding classifying the services according to 
their level of sensitiveness when prompting 
re-authentication to access those ranked higher, such as 
transferring money to other accounts, adding a new payee 
and purchasing from iTunes. Despite their indication to 
reflect the reality of fluctuating confidence on the user and 
services varying risk levels, should this procedure occur 
very often, the user is likely to get bothered. 
A few other attempts to utilize biometrics appear with 
Windows 8.1, Galaxy S5 and iPhone 5S. For example, 
Microsoft declares that they will embed the functionality of 
fingerprints to access their apps in Windows 8.1, such as 
Windows Store, Xbox Music, and Xbox Video [39]. 
Similarly, Galaxy S5 and iPhone 5S employ the fingerprint 
scanner on their home button not only to login but also to 
access some apps, such as PayPal and iTunes. Nevertheless, 
offering the option of bypassing the fingerprint for PIN or 
password, even if they are enabled, may render the feature 
not being used at all or render this process to be exploited 
by attackers where the drawbacks of secret codes remain. 
4 Featured Authentication Frameworks 
A number of researches have upheld the need for more 
innovative authentication methods that aim to balance the 
trade-off between security and convenience. The following 
sub-sections discuss the related two of these featured 
authentication frameworks, namely single sign-on and 
federated identity, in terms of the benefits they offer as well 
as their shortcomings. 
4.1 Single Sign-On 
An attempt to increase convenience and reduce the burden 
(of remembering many passwords and of entering the user’s 
credentials on each resource and application) from the user 
has evolved – single sign-on (SSO). SSO provides the user 
transparent access to all services that they have the 
privileges to access within an organization after a single 
successful login [4, 46, 47]. They, therefore, only need to 
set and recall one password to authenticate to a resource and 
subsequently attain the permission to access other services 
under the same domain without being prompted to 
authenticate again. A popular example is Google account 
with which the account holder is required to enter his/her 
credentials once to be able to use its services, such as 
Gmail, Google drive and Google calendar, during the same 
session.  
Besides the usability benefits from the users 
perspectives, SSO is perceived to be beneficial for 
organizations. It induces a level of cost effectiveness 
thereby reducing the load for administrating numerous 
credentials to access various services. Rather, there is a 
need to administer one single credential for every user 
regardless of the number of services they are authorized to 
access. Identity Access Management (IAM) system 
leverages this process (within one domain) which enables 
user-centric authentication. However, it should not be 
merely deployed to replace all logins with a single 
password, otherwise, this would be at the expense of 
protection; if this single login is cracked, it would then 
allow the intruder access to all participated services. 
Therefore, some standard protocols have been developed to 
secure the credential exchanging between services, such as 
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [46]. 
Securing the authentication process in the first place is 
still crucial which if it is done by utilizing the 
aforementioned approaches, it would yield to keeping their 
downsides, such as the need to create a complex and 
lengthy unrepeated with other systems password as well as 
the burden of memorizing and recalling it. Additionally, 
SSO assumes that the authorized person who has been 
granted access initially is the one continues accessing the 
service throughout the usage session; which is not always 
the case. Moreover, typical users have other systems that 
are under other autonomous domains and organizations. As 
a consequence, the encumbrance of cognitive memory load 
and carrying tokens may persist. 
4.2 Federated Identity 
To bridge the gap between separate domains and thus 
alleviate the burden on users, federated identity 
management has risen thereby extending the SSO concept 
from being confined to a sole domain. It aims at granting 
access for users of one organization to resources offered by 
other organizations seamlessly. To achieve this, 
inter-organizational trust relationship should be established 
[10, 48].
 Thus, there is a dire need to ensure the security of these 
cross-domains credentials whilst they are being 
communicated, which in turn leads to the development and 
deployment of standards, such as OpenID, WS-Federation, 
and Shibboleth [48, 49]. Whilst some of these standards (in 
one way or another) act as third party federated IAM 
providers, whereby an identity provider or manager 
coordinates the authentication process among the member 
parties of the federation which are the services providers 
[50], users credentials and some other information might be 
passed from one service provider to another. For instance, 
holders of Facebook account are able to use the credentials 
to access Yahoo services although they are distinct 
organizations. Hence, Facebook might send some basic 
information about the user, such as name, email, mobile 
number and photo. Accordingly, user privacy concerns 
must be overcome so that the user should have the 
discretion to decide which of their data can be shared, with 
whom and when. 
Equally important, it is argued that federated identity is 
fragile to breach proliferation if one of the associated 
services providers’ credentials hacked. However, Madsen et 
al. claimed that some of the mentioned standards offer 
mechanism to contain such a breach by de-federation [50]. 
Nevertheless, the time scale until such containment occurs 
is critical and dependent on whether it has been detected. 
As a result, an efficient federated IAM system must provide 
an effective auditing feature which poses issues on how to 
manage it on heterogeneous domains. In addition, whereas 
federated IAM approach offers promising usability 
advantages, still replacing all passwords with a single 
password is against good security practice of differing 
passwords for each system. Moreover, it is still performed 
at the point-of-entry leaving the system at risk of misuse 
afterwards. Furthermore, it focusses upon system/service 
level authentication – rather than actually looking at what 
the user is doing. 
5 Continuous and Transparent Authentication 
Systems 
Further consideration has been given to continuous and 
transparent authentication in order to solve the 
point-of-entry issue. It seeks to verify whether the user is 
genuine in a periodic or constant manner utilizing 
biometrics without interrupting the user’s normal 
interaction [7, 51]. Transparent Authentication Systems 
(TAS) have been studied by several researchers with 
varying approaches. After a thorough analysis of the related 
literature, a number of relevant search keywords have been 
identified within user authentication domain, i.e. 
“transparent”, “continuous”, “implicit”, “active”, “passive”, 
“non-intrusive”, “non-observable”, “adaptive”, 
“unobtrusive”, and “progressive” from various eminent 
academic databases. Accordingly, 93 studies have been 
reviewed, most of which (70%) only employ single 
biometric, as demonstrated in Fig. 2. 
 
Fig.2 Continuous and Transparent Authentication Systems 
As each of these models (shown in Table 2) utilizes a 
sole modality, they continue in carrying its shortcomings, 
thus enduring low matching performance, limited 
universality and higher vulnerability to spoofing attacks. 
Fusing more than one biometric (multimodal) can arguably 
contribute to overcoming or at least alleviating these flaws 
[117–119]. 
Table 2 Single biometric Transparent Authentication Systems 
 Modality Refs. 
B
eh
a
v
io
ra
l 
Keystroke [52–66]  
Mouse [67–77] 
Signature [78] 
Gait [79–87] 
Voice [88–91] 
Behavioral 
Profiling 
[92–96] 
   
P
h
y
si
o
lo
g
ic
a
l Face [97–101] 
Ear [102–105] 
Finger [106, 107] 
Palmprint [108] 
Iris [109–116] 
5.1 Multimodal Authentication Systems 
Based upon analyzing the prior art on continuous and 
transparent multimodal authentication systems, the 28 
studies are categorized into: physiological multimodal 
systems; behavioral multimodal systems; hybrid 
multimodal systems; distributed multimodal systems; and 
web- and cloud-based multimodal systems. The first three 
categories are according to the nature of the utilized 
biometric modalities, whereas the last two ones are 
according to their operational deployments that distinguish 
them from the others. 
5.1.1 Physiological Multimodal Systems 
Table 3 demonstrates proposed frameworks in this domain 
deployed a set of two traits from face and fingerprint. [120] 
consolidated facial and fingerprint recognition systems and 
 integrated their resultant output with the lapsed time to act 
relevantly. 
In evaluating their work, they proposed and used new 
performance measures, namely: Time to Correct Reject 
(TCR), Probability of Time to Correct Reject (PTCR), 
Usability, and Usability-Security Characteristic Curve 
(USC). However, it was undertaken with only 11 users 
without, even, any results. 
Whilst [121] incorporated facial recognition and 
fingerprint in their model, the latter was applied intrusively 
when the confidence level went below the specified 
threshold, making it eventually unimodal. The 
accomplished matching score of 48.6% to 72.5% indicates 
undesirable performance especially with critical 
applications. Furthermore, it and the study of [122] were 
merely simulation. 
Similarly, [123] investigated utilizing the face and iris 
modalities but again the latter in prompted in an intrusive 
manner and just at the entry point. With 61 participants, the 
verification rate was between 84-97% with a FAR was 3%. 
The desirable performance of [124] (FRR of 1.0% with 
90 users) notwithstanding, they introduced an extra 
processing overhead of 26-42%, raising usability (e.g. 
longer waiting time) and economic issues (e.g. power 
consumption). 
Table 3 Physiological Transparent Multimodal Systems 
Ref. Platform 
Biometrics Performance (%) Experiment 
Demographics 
Mode  Limitations  Features 
F* FP* I* Match FAR FRR Verification 
[120]  PC √ √      
11 participants 
30minutes 
Real 
New performance 
metrics 
Holistic fusion 
Extendable 
[121] PC √ √  48.6-72.5    300 minutes Simulation Intrusive login (FP)  
[124]  PC √ √    1.0  90 participants Prototype 
26-42% added 
processing overhead 
 
[122]  PC √ √      40 participants Simulation 
Intrusive login 
(secret) 
Multibiometric 
security API  
[123]  PC/Laptop √  √  3.0  84-97 
61 participants 
5 minutes 
Real Intrusive login (I)  
* F is Face. FP is Fingerprint. I is Iris
5.1.2 Behavioral Multimodal Systems 
The hindrance of transparently employing physiological 
biometrics has been evident; thus a shift to behavioral 
counterparts was sought (as shown in Table 4). [125–127] 
proposed the utilization of keystroke and mouse dynamics 
for this purpose. The last two studies were complemented 
by the inputs of the touch screen (touchalytics), albeit they 
achieved higher error rates (14.47 and 2.24 FAR and 1.78 
and 2.10 FRR) compared to the first study (0.651 FAR and 
1.312 FRR). They were, also, conducted under controlled 
environment with pre-specified tasks. Therefore, 
generalizing their results is questionable. 
  Another proposal used keystroke analysis whereas 
combining it with voice recognition of mobile phones was 
presented by [7, 130]. Unlike the previous frameworks, this 
experiment was with a blend of real and simulated data and 
achieved a keystroke EER of 10% and a voice EER of 25% 
(without an overall performance). Despite the attained 67% 
reduction of intrusive authentication, the recovery was 
designed to be secret PIN, hence carrying the weaknesses 
mentioned in section 2.1. 
[128] fused voice and gait recognition within a mobile 
devices context and investigated its feasibility offline on the 
usage of 31 participants. In addition to being offline, the 
resultant performance occurred on a differing range from 
2.0% to 12.0% EER, making it difficult to reflect on how it 
is in the actual live use. 
The focus was then shifted to deploying various aspects 
of behavioral profiling as in [129, 131]. The former study 
accomplished an EER of 5.4%, 2.2% and 13.5% when 
utilized the usage of calling, text messaging, and general 
applications respectively with an overall of 7.03% EER. 
Likewise, the latter experiment consolidated texting 
linguistic profiling, keystroke dynamics and behavior 
profiling and obtained an EER of 12.8%, 20.8% and 9.2% 
respectively with an overall of 3.3% and a 91% decline in 
the explicit authentication requests. However, these two 
studies were conducted entirely or partly on old 
(2004/2005) and varying offline datasets which were 
joined assuming they are of the same group of users. 
All the aforementioned frameworks can only operate on 
a distinct device (a mobile or PC). Given that users 
nowadays use typically at least one from each platform, 
extra care should be taken to their applicability and 
universality.
 Table 4 Behavioral Transparent Multimodal Systems 
Ref. Platform 
Biometrics Performance (%) Experiment 
Demographics 
Mode  Limitations  Features 
V* M* K* B* G* T* FAR FRR EER 
[125] PC  √ √    0.651 1.312  
22 participants 
9 weeks 
Real  
IDS 
Client-server 
[128] Mobile √    √    2-12 31 participants 
Offline 
experiment 
  
[126] PC  √ √   √ 14.47 1.78  
61 participants 
10 days 
Real 
Detection time 2.20 
minutes 
IDS 
[129] Mobile    √     7.03 76 participants Simulation  Off-line dataset 
Analyzed telephony, 
texting & apps services 
[7, 130] Mobile √  √    
  
(K) 10 
(V) 25 
30 participants 
7 tasks 
Real & 
Simulation 
 
67% reduction of 
intrusive authentication 
  
[131] Mobile    √     9.2 30 participants Simulation  Off-line dataset & Real 
91% reduction of 
intrusive authentication 
[127] PC  √ √   √ 2.24 2.10  
31 participants 
3 tasks 
Real   
* V is Voice. M is Mouse. K is Keystroke. B is Behavioral profiling. G is Gait. T is Touchalytics
5.1.3 Hybrid Multimodal Systems 
Researchers have recognized the operational complications 
of installing physiological biometrics only together with 
the instability of behavioral biometrics only in a 
continuous and transparent fashion. Therefore, various 
studies have been proposed deploying a mixture of 
physiological and behavioral or soft biometrics (e.g. color 
of face), as summarized in Table 5. The study of [132] was 
one of the initial endeavors which aimed to operate on and 
protect a flight deck. Despite the offered level of flexibility 
in terms of where the verification processing carried out 
(on-board or distributed), it was only conceptual with no 
implementation, the same as [133–135]. 
[136] investigated the plausibility of deploying voice 
verification, facial recognition, and fingerprint in a 
multimodal continuous authentication framework. It 
integrated them with the time at which they were acquired. 
The consequence of this integration would create a trust 
level on the user which fluctuates based upon the interval 
from the last successfully captured modalities samples. 
Accordingly, it and [137], alike, produced virtual data but 
they did not reveal any performance results. The latter, also, 
endured the problems of secret-knowledge approach as it 
utilized intrusive login using secret code. On the other 
hand, although the work of [140] was simulation also, they 
published results of fusing face and voice modalities of 30 
simulated participants for 3 separate sessions. They 
accomplished a face EER of 0.449%, a voice EER of 0.003% 
and an overall EER of 0.087%. 
[139] conducted one of the most comprehensive 
experiments in this domain. They proposed a mobile 
Non-Intrusive and Continuous Authentication (NICA) 
using those biometric techniques existing on the device to 
operate in both standalone and client-server modes – 
achieving favorable performance of 0.01% EER of 27 
users with 60 biometric samples collected. Nevertheless, 
they loosened the threshold because they utilized in-house 
biometric algorithms which, in turn, perhaps affected the 
credibility of the result. An interesting feature of NICA is 
that it was designed to use the confidence level on the 
legitimate user (proposed earlier) in order to align it with 
the user privileges to access services that have varying risk 
levels. 
Other studies investigated composite authentication 
systems of physiological and soft biometrics [141–143] on 
laptops. The first study experimented the fusion of the face 
trait along with its soft features, such as color, and claimed 
to subsequently succeed to have no FAR and an FRR of 
4.17%. Similarly, using the same biometrics, the last two 
studies achieved a recognition score of 86.88% albeit with 
only 7 users. Furthermore, their experiment adopted an 
obtrusive login (password or face) and merely the soft 
biometrics were verified throughout, which might be 
affected by the surrounding environment, leading to 
convenience issues of increasing re-authentication requests. 
Leveraging the advent of wearable technologies, [138] 
developed a wristband to be utilized as an initial login 
fingerprint sensor and then to constantly measure the user 
skin temperature and heart rate. However, the fingerprint 
was only presented at the login stage and the performance 
was quite low (matching score between 40-60%). 
Moreover, requiring an additional wristband to access a 
system, inherits the downsides of tokens.
 Table 5 Hybrid Transparent Multimodal Systems 
Ref. Platform 
Biometrics Performance (%) Experiment 
Demographics 
Mode  Limitations  Features 
F* FP* V* M* K* B* G* SB* Match  FAR FRR EER Recognition 
[132] 
Flight 
Deck 
              Conceptual 
No 
experiment 
2 designs: 
on-board & 
distributed 
verification 
Several 
biometrics 
[136] PC √ √ √           24 participants Virtual data  
Integration with 
time 
[133] Mobile          2*10-4 0.4    Conceptual 
Intrusive 
login (secret) 
Several 
biometrics 
[137] PC √     √        
 
 
Simulation 
Intrusive 
login (secret) 
 
[134] PC  √  √           Conceptual 
No 
experiment 
e-Learning 
[138] 
Wearable 
& Laptop 
√       √ 40-60      Prototype 
Intrusive 
login (F) 
Wristband 
 
[139] Mobile √  √  √       0.01  
27 participants 
45 minutes 
Real  
Extendable 
Standalone & 
client-server 
[140] PC √  √         0.087  
30 participants 
3 sessions 
Simulation  
Adaptive 
Bayesian fusion 
[141] Laptop √       √  0 4.17   20 participants Real 
Intrusive 
login (secret) 
 
[135] Mobile √  √    √        Conceptual 
No 
experiment 
Fuzzy Crypto 
[142] 
[143] 
Laptop √       √     86.88 7 participants Real  
Swarm 
intelligence 
algorithms 
* F is Face. FP is Fingerprint. V is Voice. M is Mouse. K is Keystroke. B is Behavioral. G is Gait. S is Soft biometrics.
5.1.4 Distributed Multimodal Systems 
All the aforementioned frameworks did not consider the 
current fact of a user in possession of various digital 
devices. Therefore, the studies presented in Table 6 have 
been conducted. [144] conceptually proposed deploying 
physiological signals (e.g. blood pressure and heart beat) 
and behavioral profiling. 
In the one hand, [145] prototyped a progressive 
authentication model integrating the face, voice and 
behavior profiling traits, in conjunction with proximity to 
pre-defined logged-in device(s). In spite of the claimed 
decrease of intrusive verification prompts by 42%, it was 
investigated with 9 users only and no security measures 
revealed. 
Table 6 Distributed Transparent Multimodal Systems 
Ref. Platform 
Biometrics Performance (%) Experiment 
Demographics 
Mode  Limitations  Features 
F* V* B* PS* FAR FRR EER 
[144] PDA   √ √     Conceptual No experiment One user to Many devices  
[145] Mobile & PC √ √ √     9 participants Prototype  
42% reduction of 
intrusive authentication 
[146] 
PDA & various 
devices 
  √     
20 participants 
14 days 
Real & 
Simulation 
Utilizes Secret 
& Token 
74% reduction of 
intrusive authentication 
* F is Face. V is Voice. B is Behavioral profiling. PS is Physiological Signals.
 From the same standpoint, [146] developed their 
Authentication Aura system utilizing what authentication 
techniques exist on each device, i.e. secret, behavioral 
profiling, and even personal dumb objects, such as keys. 
Both the authentication status of and the user confidence 
level on each participating device are communicated 
between each other within a close proximity to form an 
overall confidence. Whilst it was carried out on a blend of 
real and simulated data of 20 participants, its focus was 
more on usability (74% less explicit authentication 
occurrences. Additionally, further examination on the 
processing overhead on each device is needed. 
5.1.5 Web-based Multimodal Systems 
[147, 148] proposed a solution to mitigate the processing 
burden on users’ devices and make it occurs, instead, on a 
web server. In order to secure web services, [147] fused 
mouse and keystroke dynamics for continuous identity 
verification following a preliminary secret-knowledge 
login. They obtained a distinct EER for each modality 
(22.41 and 24.78 respectively) and an overall EER of 8.21. 
Apart from the persistence issues of intrusive login, their 
framework is not compatible when using a mobile device, 
with which there is no mouse inputs and the keystroke is 
likely to be limited. 
[148] proposed an Internet protocol – Context Aware 
Security by Hierarchical Multilevel Architecture 
(CASHIMA) – capable to act as a multimodal biometric 
authentication system. It adopted the TAS user confidence 
(trust) notion that is fluctuating based on the captured 
biometrics’ time and quality, upon which users privileges 
are authorized remotely. In assessing their prototype, they 
integrated facial and voice recognition, on a smartphone. 
Nonetheless, they did not reveal an overall performance 
but for individual trait; False Match Rate (FMR) of 2.58% 
and 10% respectively. Despite the promising universality 
features their framework offered, it needs to be extensively 
evaluated with real data not just as a prototype to examine 
various metrics, such as feasibility, scalability, and 
privacy-preserving. 
Table 7 Web- and Cloud-based Transparent Multimodal Systems 
Ref. Platform 
Biometrics Performance (%) Experiment 
Demographics 
Mode  Limitations  Features 
F* V* K* M* FMR EER 
[147] Web   √ √ 
 (M) 22.41 
24 participants 
8 weeks 
Real 
Intrusive login 
(secret) 
Bayesian fusion  (K) 24.78 
 8.21 
[148] Web √ √   
(V) 10   
Prototype 
Intrusive login 
(fingerprint) 
 
(F)2.58   
* F is Face. V is Voice. K is Keystroke. M is Mouse.
5.2 Users’ Perceptions of Multimodal TAS 
[7, 139] investigated the users’ perceptions and acceptance 
of transparent authentication. They found that 92% of 27 
participants and 73% of 30 participants, respectively, 
believed that transparent authentication provided a more 
secure environment than other conventional authentication. 
Accordingly, 90% of the latter’s participants stated that 
they would use the transparent authentication technique if 
it is offered to them. The relative small samples of both 
studies notwithstanding, TAS can be appreciated as a 
remarkable solution to effectively remove the reliance 
upon the human aspects to ensure a robust and usable 
authentication. On the one hand, 83% of 470 respondents 
who own smartphone and tablet would like to have 
seamless experience across all their devices [149]. 
5.3 Open Issues on Previous Studies 
As the research revolving transparent authentication 
evolves, so do its evaluation and feasibility studies. It is 
apparent that a multimodal TAS approach outweighs its 
single modal counterpart due to proven security 
performance enhancement. However, the abovementioned 
reviewed studies suffer from one or more of the following 
open issues that need to be tackled in future research: 
5.3.1 Lack of Transparency 
It is found that a few frameworks are not, operationally, 
fully transparent as they integrated a form of intrusive 
login (i.e. secret, fingerprint or iris). This leads them to 
carry the limitations of secret-knowledge authentication 
approach, the single modality, and intrusive authentication. 
5.3.2 Lack of Universality 
The majority of them, also, are confined to work in a 
specific context and/or device, rendering them to lack the 
universality attribute that enables a seamless technology 
and service independent functioning. 
5.3.3 Negligence of varying services risk levels 
Some studies consider the fluctuation of user identity 
confidence/trust. Nevertheless, a little of them aligned it 
with the varying risk levels of conducted activities or 
accessed services, which is not the case with the real use. 
5.3.4 Incomprehensive Evaluation 
In terms of evaluation, those studies showed performance 
results carried out their experiments either on 
simulated/semi-simulated data or real but insufficient and 
offline data. In addition, some of them focused on usability 
solely whilst others on security only. Moreover, there were 
specific tasks for participants to perform, lending it not to 
 give a better insight about the system when they put in real 
live practice. Furthermore, some other related features 
would be difficult to measure, such as scalability, privacy, 
and subsequently user satisfaction. 
5.4 Desirable Characteristics for an Effective 
Multimodal TAS 
In order to offer an effective multimodal TAS, it should go 
through comprehensive stages, from the design to the 
appraisal, bearing in mind a number of critical factors. As a 
result of the thorough survey and analysis, the following 
desirable requirements are concluded in order to be in 
place to overcome the aforementioned open issues: 
 no intrusive login, 
 no additional device or sensor, 
 flexibility to deploy mixture of biometrics, 
 continuous user identity confidence, 
 services risk levels aligned with user identity 
confidence, 
 minimal processing overhead, 
 high scalability, 
 compatible with various platforms, 
 real and adequate number of evaluation participants, 
 task-free experiment, 
 security measures to secure and manage biometric 
templates database and biometric samples in transient. 
5.5 A Framework for Federated Authentication 
in the Cloud 
Stemming from the abovementioned desirable 
characteristics, the authors have propounded a federated 
biometric authentication framework, shifting the burden of 
both the authentication processing and management 
responsibility to centralized Managed Authentication 
Service Provider (MASP) [150]. As shown in Fig. 3, this 
MASP is hosted on the cloud and receives biometric 
signals from and control the verification decision of the 
subscribed user’s devices. These devices can benefit from 
the confidence level of each other as they are fused on the 
MASP and communicated to those participating devices 
within a close proximity. This accumulated identity 
confidence status is utilized in both device and service 
domain as MASP would verify the user identity 
continuously and transparently whilst they access services 
on the device or online depending upon their determined 
risk level. For example, had the user logged into his 
smartphone using a fingerprint, they would, within 
specified period of time and proximity, automatically 
logged into their registered laptop transparently without 
having to re-enter their biometrics unless the user 
confidence status is below the risk level of the requested 
service. 
 
Fig. 3 A Framework of Federated Authentication in the Cloud 
Even though this model is deemed to offer a potential 
solution for many issues of the aforementioned systems, it 
is still solely conceptual. Therefore, it lacks required tests 
to appraise acute issues, such as scalability, biometrics 
management, and battery consumption of portable digital 
devices. Thus, developing this proposed model and 
evaluating it with real and live data will perhaps give better 
insight about its feasibility and value in solving the 
technology and research problem. 
5.5.1 Limitations and Future Challenges 
Despite the fact that such a model would have the 
provisions of effective security and usability, it raises a 
number of limitations as future challenges that need to be 
addressed in order for it to function effectively. 
 Trust: users and organizations are required to have a 
high level of trust in a third-party authentication 
provider; 
 Scalability and response time: the time spent to make an 
authentication decision through the network may 
introduce a potential delay in transit and bottle-neck at 
the MASP; 
 Privacy: From an end-user perspective, preserving their 
privacy thereby securing their biometrics information 
(during the transfer, processing and storage) is essential. 
Therefore, MASP architecture must be sensibly 
designed to ensure this and eliminate misuse. 
6 Conclusion 
Verifying the authenticity of a user to use a digital device 
or service has become crucial. Individuals, businesses and 
governments undertake an ever-growing range of activities 
online and via mobile devices. Unfortunately these 
activities, services and information are the targets of 
 cybercrimes. Authentication is at the vanguard of ensuring 
that only the authorized user is given access; however, it 
has historically endured a range of issues related to the 
security and usability of the approaches. Further to this, 
they are still mostly functioning at the point of entry, and 
even those performing sort of re-authentication executing it 
in an intrusive manner. 
The majority of frameworks that were proposed to 
solve this issue deployed a single biometric to re-verify the 
user in a continuous but implicit fashion. Nonetheless, they 
have inherited the downsides of the utilized modality so 
they have issues regarding the universality and 
circumvention. 
Therefore, a serious move towards employing two or 
more biometric modality in TAS has been taken. However, 
most of the previous studies in this domain fall short in one 
or more drawbacks in relation to lack of full transparency, 
universality, interoperability, scalability, high performance, 
and real data. In order to provide users with adequate 
protection and convenience, innovative robust 
authentication mechanisms have to be utilized in a 
universal level, so they operate in a transparent, continuous 
and user-friendly fashion. 
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